Diverse histories, shared social issues: the Australian and by Phillips, Ruth
1 
1 
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Ruth Phillips 
Introduction 
As recognised by social policy scholars, social policy in Korea1 is 
a relatively new field of governance and practice (Chang-sik & 
Shaw, 2003; Huck-Ju, 1997; Sung, 2003). Owing to its relatively 
recent industrialisation, democratisation and consequent 
dramatic changes in demography and society (Lee, 1999, 2004; 
Chang, 2004), the state of the Republic of Korea has recently 
turned its attention to some core social problems and 
democratically driven demands to which most Western 
industrialised states have had to develop responses for over  
a century.  
Australia, in its short history as a sovereign nation, has had a 
much longer engagement with social policy than has Korea. 
There are both similarities and contradictions that emerge when 
one compares Australia with Korea and this poses challenges to 
finding suitable theoretical approaches to understanding the 
countries’ comparative responses to demographic change and 
policy developments. There is strong appeal for policy makers to 
examine different ways of addressing core social problems such 
as those that emerge with each generation in post-industrial 
states; however, can these policy responses be easily reconciled 
given diverse cultural and historical contexts? In one sense the 
trajectories and initial political cultures for the two social  
policy regimes are almost contrary to one another. Australia, 
with its ‘wage-earner welfare state’ (Castles, 1985) model, 
emerging from an egalitarian political culture, its more recent 
                                                     
1 For simplicity’s sake, throughout this book South Korea, or the Republic 
of Korea, will be referred to as Korea. 
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responses to its marginalised Indigenous population and the 
current turn toward a neo-liberal governance model, is 
distinctive. It bears little similarity to Korea’s rapid transition 
from an agrarian to an industrial market under totalitarian 
regimes and subsequent democratisation, and a ‘productivist’ 
welfare response to social needs currently reflected in the 
modern Korean welfare state. However, given the widespread 
impact of globalisation on modern industrialised democratic 
states, the generally accepted ‘crisis’ of the traditional welfare 
state and the key generational problems both countries are 
experiencing, there are some similarities.  
The chapters of this book focus on the search for new ideas on 
how to address core social policy issues such as: the social 
support needs of an ageing population; support for 
intergenerational care; young people and the Internet; public 
health care and population policies. These issues are of deep 
interest to policy-makers and government and community 
leaders in both countries. The ideas presented in this book are 
some of the ideas that will determine the nature and quality of 
the future in Australia and Korea. 
As a more established welfare state, Australia offers tested ways 
of addressing social needs and problems. There has been a great 
deal of interest from Korea’s government and non-government 
organisations (NGOs) in some of the models of delivery of social 
services in Australia, particularly in the fields of aged care, 
health and children (Phillips & Jang, 2005). This interest is 
partly based on a need to look beyond the United States and 
Europe for ideas about how to address the consequences of late 
industrialisation, but may also be due to a conception of the 
Australian model as an efficient and effective welfare state. 
However, in the past decade or so, many welfare state scholars in 
Australia consider recent changes and trends in the Australian 
situation to be bleak and regressive (Saunders, 2002; Mendes, 
2003; Jamrozik, 2005; McClelland & Smyth, 2006). Therefore, in 
regard to social policy developments, in a broad sense, Australia 
and Korea are heading in opposite directions. The Korean 
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government is seeking to build a more effective set of policies to 
improve the social protection of its citizens as a direct result of 
its ever-strengthening democracy, whilst the current Australian 
Government, which has been in power for nearly 10 years, has 
embarked on a program of dismantling or weakening its social 
protection functions as it pursues an ever more efficient, 
individualistic, market-driven model of ‘enabling’ welfare.  
As an interdisciplinary set of writings the chapters have no single 
theoretical or political position as each author brings his or her 
own perspectives to their areas of expertise. Although the 
welfare state is not an explicitly stated interest in the following 
chapters of this book, it is hoped that this chapter will provide a 
framework for viewing the different countries’ formal 
approaches to managing social problems. This chapter explores 
the distinct welfare state developments in Australia and Korea as 
a way of painting a political and social backdrop for the ensuing 
discussions by authors from both countries. 
Defining the welfare state 
The idea of the welfare state is complex, often contested and can 
be viewed or analysed from a range of perspectives. Jamrozik 
observes that social welfare “implies a set of provisions and 
mechanisms designed to ensure a certain standard of living for a 
country’s population, especially delivering for those who, for 
whatever reason, are unable to provide such conditions by 
themselves and need assistance from society” (2005: 2). Jamrozik 
also draws attention to broader political understandings such as 
Jens Alber’s (1985) idea of the welfare state as “a polity in which 
state responsibilities extend beyond the mere maintenance of 
internal order and external security to a public responsibility for 
the wellbeing of citizens” and that it can be viewed as indicative 
of an affluent society in which the state strives for economic 
growth as a solution to wellbeing, or indeed for intervention into 
the economy to ensure more equal distribution of the benefits 
of economic growth (as cited in Jamrozik, 2005: 3).  
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The redistributive role of the welfare state has also been 
highlighted in the context of globalisation due to an increasing 
need for the state to act as a buffer to protect its citizens from 
the negative effects of global capitalism and to ameliorate the 
effects of the globally integrated domestic free-market economy. 
It is also at this nexus that welfare states have been most affected 
and consequently restructured and redefined. This is clearly the 
case with the contemporary Australian welfare state and, in the 
Korean context, is the environment in which its welfare state 
model has been formulated. 
Comparative welfare state studies have drawn heavily on the 
work of Esping-Anderson’s (1990) influential typology outlined 
in his ‘three regimes theory’, which divides established welfare 
states into liberal, corporatist or social democratic models. 
However, due to the effects of globalisation, as well as ‘the 
welfare state crisis’ and the growth of welfare states in Asia, this is 
now viewed as a dated model. Esping-Anderson has 
acknowledged, in later work, that the three regimes theory is no 
longer sufficient to cover the changes to the welfare state in the 
late 20th and early 21st century world. The idea of a ‘crisis of the 
welfare state’ is pervasive and is linked to three key factors: trade-
offs between egalitarianism and employment, the narrowing 
effect of globalisation on domestic social policy choice, and the 
global phenomenon of the ageing population (Esping-
Anderson, 1996: 2).  Many commentators (Esping-Anderson, 
1996; Jamrozik, 2005; McMahon et al, 1996) believe that the 
crisis of the welfare state is linked to market failure – as many as 
those who attribute it to welfare state failure in terms of 
achieving overall social wellbeing. What is overwhelmingly 
agreed upon, is that the dominance of neo-liberalism and free 
market economics has meant that most welfare states are 
suffering under processes of deregulation, privatisation and 
residualism (or safety net welfare). As demonstrated in the 
current Australian context, neo-liberalism brings a strong 
ideological position that promotes anti-dependency and a highly 
individualist social view and it strives for minimal state 
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intervention in the lives of families and individuals, preferring 
the family or civil society organisations to be the central 
providers of welfare or well-being. This shift has led Jamrozik to 
develop the notion of the ‘post-welfare state’ which, as a 
minimalist state, provides minimum income support rather than 
act in a redistributive way and to actively encourage inequality by 
basing social policy on a philosophy of competition (2005: 10–
11). It also reflects a shift away from a citizenship rights-based 
model of welfare to one that delineates between  
the deserving and undeserving recipient of state support or 
social protection. 
Crucial, and importantly linked to the social, political and 
economic conditions of the rapidly emergent Korean welfare 
state, are the links between democracy and redistribution. 
Jamrozik observes that, “social policy in the welfare state meant 
the application of democratic values and principles of equality 
and fairness to the decisions of governments on the allocation of 
resources through redistribution of the economic surplus 
generated in the economy” (2005: 11). This democratic process 
is about managing the economy, not necessarily intervening in 
market mechanisms, a view that is often a key economic 
argument against state expenditure or wealth redistribution. For 
Jamrozik, a properly functioning welfare state has both a 
‘facilitating’ or enabling function and a ‘maintaining’ or 
controlling function so that it works to facilitate economic 
growth whilst protecting its citizens against the ill effects of 
disadvantage or inequality (2005: 12).  
In his recent reflections on the future of the welfare state, 
Esping-Anderson observes that it is important for the welfare 
state to be viewed as a social investment, not an economic cost to 
the state (2002: 9). He also proposes that in considering a new 
welfare state model for the future, there are key social policy 
commitments that must underlie such a structure. These include 
the specific value of investing in families as a means of ensuring 
the productive contribution of children in the future, and 
gender equity policies that should not be regarded as simply ‘a 
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concession to women’s claims’ but as a means of addressing 
national fertility, childhood poverty and future labour shortages, 
crucial aspects of ‘any positive post-industrial equilibrium’ 
(Esping-Anderson, 2002: 10). He also raises concerns about the 
key generational issue of ageing and emphasises the need for 
“intergenerational equity (a fair distribution of the costs of 
future retirement between workers and retirees) and 
intergenerational justice (safeguarding the welfare of the 
weakest, both in working life and in retirement)” (2002: 24). 
However Esping-Anderson also warns against applying a single 
design to diverse welfare systems even though most face similar 
social problems (2002: 25). Although Esping-Anderson’s and his 
colleagues’ project of anticipating the needs of a new type of 
welfare state has a primarily European focus, it offers important 
reflections on the future of all welfare states and the remarkably 
similar pressures that all welfare states are facing.  
The Australian welfare state 
The historical origins of Australia’s welfare state are related to 
the federation in 1901 of its separate colonies as states under a 
national government that became responsible for gathering 
income tax. Beginning with a means-tested national pension 
scheme that was funded out of general revenue in 1908,  
national social policy grew gradually, responding to major social 
and economic events and changes such as Australia’s 
participation in World War Two. There was a peak in social 
policy development between 1941 and 1949, when basic 
legislative and service components were introduced. During this 
time poverty was recognised as a key problem and the 
government introduced core social security payments such as 
child endowment; funeral benefits for deceased pensioners; 
some maternity allowances; widow's pensions and 
unemployment, sickness and pharmaceutical benefits. The 
second peak of social policy development was in the 1970s, 
responding to strong women’s and labour movements and a 
social democratic ideal of the welfare state. The Labor 
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government of the time introduced radical initiatives such as 
universal health care, free tertiary education, Indigenous self-
determination strategies, sole parents benefits and funding for 
women’s policy and child care. Since then, there have been 
sweeping changes and consolidations based on which political 
party has been in power, but external factors associated with 
globalisation have driven a universal tendency toward an 
economic rationalist approach to social policy. 
Many Australian social welfare researchers (Jamrozik, 2005; 
Mendes, 2003; Pusey, 2003; Saunders, 2002) are critical of the 
current directions of Australian social policy. There is broad 
agreement that there has been a dramatic increase in inequality 
and that the punitive nature of recent welfare reforms is  
creating an underclass of the most disadvantaged. Within  
what is described in Australia as a ‘left wing’ and ‘right wing’ 
political divide, however, there are some researchers who still 
identify with a right wing position, promoting the value of 
increased marketisation of welfare and advising on the direction 
of the current government’s welfare reforms (Saunders & 
Tsumori, 2002).  
Historically, Australia’s welfare state is based on egalitarianism. 
This was due to its direct link to the establishment of a basic 
wage as a measure of social security benefits, and its focus on 
promoting full employment and a relatively low number of 
‘working poor’ (Mendes, 2003: 27). Under the short but 
dramatic reign of the Whitlam Labor government (1973–75) 
and during the years of the Hawke and Keating Labor 
governments (1983–96), it had also maintained some key 
functions of a more redistributive or social democratic model. 
These were the nationally state funded old age, unemployment, 
disability and sole parent pensions/benefits, free public school 
education and a national state-provided health care system, 
Medicare. The Australian electorate has shown in successive 
general elections that it considers these social policy objectives as 
pillars of the Australian welfare state and characteristic of our 
‘fair go’ society; and, as Michael Pusey’s research found, many 
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Australians did not want to ‘end up like America’ (2003: 182). A 
factor reflecting how we might end up like America, is evident in 
the increase in poverty due to the steady erosion of our 
protective wages system, our health system, our education system 
and our general recognition of the role of welfare. Under the 
Howard Coalition government the sense of egalitarianism 
appears to be giving way to a purer liberal welfare state model. 
There is a sense in the Australian community that the nation’s 
closer economic, political and security ties to the USA are also 
bringing closer alignment in approaches to welfare provision, 
often viewed as a highly divided rich/poor social model.  
Current welfare services expenditure2 in Australia is 2.3 per cent 
of GDP or, based on 2003 data, $17.1 billion, which is average 
within the OECD countries. Of this total, $11.9 billion was 
funded by sources within the government sector and the 
remaining $5.2 billion by non-government sources (AIHW, 
2005: 4). However, Australia’s historically strong and effective 
welfare state has shifted toward what Gilbert terms an enabling 
state, where the government is working hard to create a social 
and political atmosphere of public support for private 
responsibility (2004: 43). In this model the governing principles 
of the enabling state, which relies on the private effort and 
responsibility of citizens and non-government organisations, are 
embedded in larger ideas that differentiate the ‘enabling state’ 
from the ‘conventional welfare state’ paradigm. Gilbert points 
out that this is measured by how far away it shifts from the ‘ideal’ 
social democratic welfare state “which has been widely 
considered the most generous and comprehensive arrangement 
for social protection” (2004: 43). The enabling state is 
                                                     
2 Total social expenditure by Australian governments, non-government 
community service organisations and households in 2002–03 was estimated 
at $103.8 billion. Of this, $52.0 billion was social security benefits and other 
cash payments; $34.7 billion was mandatory employer-funded 
superannuation; the remaining $17.1 billion was spent on the provision of 
welfare services (AIHW, 2005: 1). 
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characterised by market-oriented approaches to welfare, 
including privatisation of welfare services, and a belief that the 
market is more efficient and therefore better at everything. This 
is very much the ideology of the current Australian Government. 
It has pursued an agenda, through deregulation, privatisation, 
and industrial relations, taxation and welfare reform that has 
clearly shifted the onus of care and social support from the state 
to the individual. 
A further characteristic of the current politics of the Australian 
Government has meant that, along with the impact of a 
‘reformist’ economic agenda, social policy has also been 
dramatically affected by strong social conservative views. This 
had had the effect of turning back social policy progress in the 
areas of women’s status, equality and security, race and cultural 
relations, protection and security for sole parents, security for 
gays and lesbians, and the imposition of national security at the 
expense of individual freedoms.  
Australian welfare reform, 1999 to 2006 
The best example of the effects of social conservatism and neo-
liberalism is in the Australian Government’s welfare reform 
agenda. The key principle of this agenda is the move from 
dependency to self-reliance; and this is played out in the theme 
of ‘mutual obligation’. 
Economic cost and the growth in the cost of welfare were key 
arguments for the government's reform agenda that’s aim was to 
reduce the cost of welfare and reduce the number of people 
dependent on the state for income support. The Australian 
Government spent $23 billion on income support for working-
aged people from 2001–2002 and $52 billion overall on social 
security benefits and old age pensions in 2003–04. Specific 
groups such as people on disabilities pensions, sole parents and 
long term unemployed were targeted by these reforms. 
Australia’s high rate of family joblessness, 850,000 children live 
in 435,000 such families was also raised as key motivation for 
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reform (Department of Family and Community Services, 2004).  
In 1999 the Australian Government embarked on its welfare 
reform agenda, beginning with a formal review of the state of 
Australian welfare.  
In the process of the review, the concept of social obligation was 
used to develop the concept of ‘mutual obligation’. The review 
report stated that these obligations are reciprocal and should 
extend across a whole community. It also stated that  
business, individuals and communities should have social 
obligations and should be incorporated into welfare reform. The 
idea of social partnerships emerged; as it was argued that the 
main reason for supporting a broad application of mutual 
obligation was because it would benefit welfare dependent 
people, by preventing entrenched social exclusion (Australian 
Government, 2000).  
As broad concepts of mutual obligation evident in the review 
were translated into bureaucratic practices, they became rigid 
and punitive and, as Saunders (2002) observed, are now driven 
by the overriding need to reduce costs Social security policy had 
become obsessed with debates over means rather than ends. 
“These changes are part of a broader strategy to shift blame away 
from the failure of the government to address poverty effectively 
onto the limitations of those who rely on the system for income 
support” (Saunders, 2002: 57). 
Mutual obligation, the idea that those who receive assistance in 
times of need should be required to ‘give something back’, is 
based on the idea that a strong framework of obligation will 
encourage people to move from welfare to work and is seen as 
the solution to idleness among the unemployed and a response 
to the unpopularity of a welfare system that is losing support 
from those who pay for it. Although developed theoretically by 
Lawrence M. Mead (1986) in Beyond Entitlement: the Social 
Obligations of Citizenship, it was first applied by Prime Minister 
Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, where in his words, there was  
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a perceived political need to restore public trust and confidence 
in the welfare state.  
In the context of this section of the chapter, mutual obligation is 
clearly an apt mechanism for the ‘enabling state’ and essentially 
relies on individual, not state, responsibility. Although it began 
with a focus on young people in ‘work for the dole’ programs, in 
each successive stage of reform the net for welfare recipients 
within the mutual obligation framework has been widening. Its 
impact has been highly punitive and people who are most 
disadvantaged are at greater risk of poverty than before. It works 
on a system whereby benefits are denied if obligations such as 
attending an interview or responding to a letter are not met. 
Now that the net includes sole parents, who are required to 
obtain work when their children reach school age and people 
with disabilities or chronic illness, who must seek and obtain 
part-time work, the notion of targeted welfare has also 
disappeared. Since 2006, this extended group of people who rely 
on the state for income support are now described as failing to 
meet obligations and are placed into a ‘financial case 
management’ system, a process contracted out to non-
government agencies to make judgments about whether people 
who fail should get emergency support to help them survive 
periods without any income support due to failing to meet 
requirements. The risk of this system is that rather than pushing 
the most marginalised people into work, it may push them into 
dire poverty and loss of dignity as they are forced to depend on 
demeaning hand-outs in the form of credit for a specific 
supermarket chain. 
The Australian Government’s welfare reform program, in 
partnership with reduced intervention into the labour market to 
ensure employment, reflects the depth of change in the 
Australian welfare state in the past decade or so. There are many 
other examples, in current Australian social policy where there 
are equally cogent changes reflecting a shift away from a welfare 
state to an enabling state. Knowledge of Australia’s recent and 
historical transformations is central to an understanding of the 
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current Australian welfare state. In the context of this book 
about generational change in Australian and Korea, 
understanding the current nature and place of social protection 
or welfare in Australia is central to considering the types of 
policy responses that will have to be developed in the future to 
address the impact of changes across discrete generations. 
The Korean welfare state 
In the broader disciplines of comparative welfare state 
scholarship and policy studies, Korea is seen to have some 
unique and intriguing characteristics. It has been variously 
described as functioning under ‘developmental liberalism’ 
(Chang, 2004: 127), as a Confucian welfare state (Sung, 2003: 
384; Holliday, 2000: 706), as a ‘productive welfare state’ (Kwon, 
2002: 2), or operating in a ‘development-universalist mode’ 
within ‘productivist welfare capitalism’ (Gough, 2000: 14; Shin & 
Shaw, 2003: 335). The struggle in scholarship to categorise or 
describe the Korean welfare state reflects the Eurocentricity of 
welfare state theory and the relative newness of social policy in 
Northern and Southern East Asian states. Gough and Kim, in 
exploring the application of ‘welfare mix’ measurement, 
determined that Korea has a genuinely mixed welfare system, 
with, for example, three-fifths of health expenditure coming 
from ‘the market’ or private sector (2000: 6). 
Holliday discusses developing a typology for Korea as a welfare 
state, in an exploration of ‘productivist welfare capitalism’, 
drawing on Esping-Anderson’s (1990) above-mentioned pivotal 
work of ‘three regimes theory’ (2000: 706). What is useful about 
Esping-Anderson’s framework in this discussion is that the 
framework regards all welfare states as having emerged 
developmentally in response to capitalism, each type of regime 
relying on different post-war political influences. Based on 
Esping-Anderson’s two key principles as first, a capitalist order 
and second, a welfare state that extends social rights, East Asian 
states such as Korea can be viewed in a consistent framework 
that acknowledges their ‘particularism’ (Holliday, 2000). Asian 
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states have developed the productivist model of the welfare state, 
which is subordinate to economic policy, links social rights to 
productivity and is premised on overriding growth objectives, 
thus creating a further model to add to Esping-Anderson’s 
‘three regimes theory’ and resulting in four ‘worlds’ of welfare 
capitalism (Holliday, 2000: 709).  As will be seen by the 
discussion below, this does apply to how the Korean welfare state 
has emerged but it is questionable whether it will continue to be 
an accurate typology as the relative newness of the Korean 
welfare state implies a trajectory that will change and mature. 
The key themes about the emergence and current nature of the 
Korean welfare state can be summarised as: 
• Korea’s short experience as a welfare state  
• The emphasis on extraordinary economic development 
in Korea 
• The initial emergence of social policies under 
authoritarian regimes 
• Globalisation and the East Asian economic crisis 
• The utilisation of Confucianism as a ‘cultural’ 
justification in determining policy 
• The state as welfare regulator rather than provider 
• Demographic and relationship changes in Korean 
families 
• The ageing population, and  
• Other social problems that emerge in a post-industrial 
state, such as the fertility crisis, child protection and 
poverty. 
Korea’s dramatic transformation from an agrarian to an 
industrial society in a very short period of time is the single most 
important structural factor in the development of the Korean 
welfare state. The most dramatic social consequence of this 
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process was its effect on the family, diminishing the extended 
family structure (Shin & Shaw, 2003) and the economic capacity 
of families to have children at the same rate (Chang, 2004). This 
has led to the increasing dominance of the nuclear family  
model and a decline in the capacity of families to care for ageing 
members. It is also linked, according to Shin and Shaw, to  
an increase in family breakdown through divorce, the fertility 
rate crisis and to young people choosing to live single lives 
(2003: 332).  
It is important to note that the foundations of the contemporary 
Korean welfare state were established by authoritarian regimes, 
beginning in the 1960s. However, the concept and ideals of a 
Korean welfare state were established earlier, as they were 
included in the constitution in 1948 (Lee, 1999: 25). During the 
1950s and up until the mid-1960s, Korea suffered extensive 
absolute poverty, with 60–70 per cent of the population 
estimated to be living in poverty, and was a high level recipient 
of foreign aid (Lee, 1999: 26; Henderson et al, 2002: 2). The 
extreme poverty was largely due to the destruction of national 
infrastructure and economy during the Korean War (1950-53) 
and posed a very bleak future for its large agrarian population 
(Henderson et al, 2002: 2). As Minns observes, the 
extraordinarily rapid economic growth following the post-war 
period, from 1961 to 1987, was facilitated by the state’s capacity 
to implement a strongly developmental policy whilst being 
“insulated from demands of social classes which may have 
diverted it from its objective of industrialisation” (2001: 1025). 
This view applies equally to the role of women in this period 
which was defined by a traditional Confucian structure assigning 
women three distinct roles in Korean society: “family 
reproduction; productive income generation and; voluntary 
community work” (Jung, 2004: 2).  
From 1961 to 1987 Korea experienced three different 
authoritarian regimes under an ‘authoritarian developmental 
state’ model, all with a similarly minimal commitment to social 
policy which was viewed as a political instrument only (Lee, 
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1999: 26). This period saw dramatic economic growth at 9.8 per 
cent a year over 25 years, contributing to a rapid rise in the 
overall standard of living and the transformation from an 
agrarian to an industrial society (Lee, 1999: 26). The repressive 
and undemocratic nature of the state during this period meant 
that the social policies that were introduced were selective and 
minimal (Lee, 1999: 26).  This process became pronounced 
under The Third Republic, having made a commitment to 
abolishing poverty and establishing a welfare state. Although it 
was successful in reducing absolute poverty, wages were kept very 
low and welfare reforms were mainly administrative or the 
introduction of benefits for select groups such as the military 
and government employees (Lee, 1999: 27). Lee observed that 
the establishment of pensions for these groups was a means of 
securing loyalty to a government that lacked legitimacy at the 
time (1999: 27).  
It was during the last decade of this period that a democracy 
movement emerged as part of a formal labour movement and 
two key social policies were established: a revised Medical 
Insurance Act and the National Welfare Pension Act (1973), 
although these were not put into effect until 1977 and 1988 
respectively (Lee, 1999: 28). The Medical Insurance Law was the 
first major social policy on health, although initially it only 
extended to large workplaces with over 500 employees and a 
system for low income and poor people covered by the then 
restrictive Public Assistance scheme, called Medicaid (Joo, 1999: 
390; Jo & Choi, 2002: 8). It was not until 1989 that the Korean 
population as a whole received compulsory cover under the 
national scheme (Jo & Choi, 2002: 8). 
The model of employer-based pension and health self-insurance 
remains as a core part of the Korean welfare state. Various 
reforms over the period extended health insurance to 
encompass more of the population (some 42 per cent were 
covered by 1985) (Lee, 1999: 28). Nevertheless, in vast contrast 
to the government-funded Australian national health insurance 
system, Koreans have always had to pay, and still do, almost  
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half of their total medical costs directly, even those covered 
under the Medical Aid Programme (Shin, 2000: 87; Jo & Choi, 
2002: 10). 
Key to the development of a welfare state is the promotion of 
gender equity. Although women were granted the right to vote 
in the 1948 Constitution, it was not until the government 
established the Korean Women’s Development Institute that the 
idea of ‘women’s policy’ emerged in 1983 (Jung, 2004). This was 
a relatively ineffectual body until 1987 when it gained important 
political influence in policy and governance development in 
government (Jung, 2004). Although there was a strong women’s 
movement in Korea from the 1970s onwards it was reluctant to 
engage with the authoritarian state, and therefore operated 
through churches, notable for the promotion of core feminist 
claims for education for women and for their active opposition 
to sex tourism (which had been openly encouraged by the 
government in the post-war period) (Jung, 2004). As Jung notes 
the other site for demands for greater equity for women was 
universities, with the first women’s studies course being 
established in 1977 at the Ewha Women’s University, where they 
earned a reputation for promoting women’s issues as key social 
issues (Jung, 2004). It was, however, primarily due to 
international and national pressures in the late 1980s that 
women’s policy evolved into important legislative and 
programmatic change. This included the Equal Opportunity Act 
(1987), the Basic Plan on Women’s Development (1985) and 
the Mother and Child Health Act (1986) (Jung, 2004). Despite 
these reforms, the causes and consequences of gender inequity 
were not addressed and it was not until Korea adopted a 
genuine democratic system in the late 1990s, that women’s 
policy began to be effective (Jung, 2004).  
Also during this period the Korean government provided some 
support for community-based organisations to establish 
themselves as social welfare services, focussing on day care for 
children, support for the elderly, and some support for people 
with disabilities (Lee, 1999: 29). The real development of a 
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social policy response to people with disabilities was assisted by 
Seoul’s nomination for the 1988 Paralympics, which resulted in 
dramatically changed attitudes within government and wider 
Korean society (Yun & Nam, 1999: 484). From 1988 onwards, a 
number of key social policies were established to assist 
rehabilitation and care, employment programs and assistance 
for medical, educational and care expenses (Yun & Nam, 1999: 
485). However, the social policy response to people with 
disabilities relied more on institutional rather than home 
support and was primarily available in urban centres (Yun & 
Nam, 1999: 489).  
Despite growth in welfare spending between 1987 and 1997, 
Korea still performed poorly in its overall social services 
spending – even compared to other East Asian states such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia, both of which spend around 11 per cent 
of GDP on welfare (You & Lee, 2000: 21). However, as You and 
Lee (2000) point out government spending is only a small part 
of ‘the social policy problem’ in South Korea. They observe that 
the government’s economic policy of ‘growth first, distribution 
next’ still resounds in its current approach. This is supported by 
Gough and Kim’s analysis of Korea’s welfare state, where they 
observed that little had changed in the mix of private sector, 
public sector, non-government sector and families’ welfare in 
the decade up to 1997 (2000: 6). 
According to Huck-Ju Kwon (2002) and others (Kwon, 2000, 
Lee, 2004; Shin, 2000; You & Lee, 2000), the East Asian 
economic crisis precipitated a unique response in Korea, as one 
of the countries hit hardest by the crisis. He explains that Korea 
not only undertook significant economic reforms, but embarked 
on ‘vigorously implemented social policy initiatives’ in response 
to the crisis (Kwon, 2002: 2). This view is also shared by Shin and 
Shaw, who observed, ‘one of the unintended consequences of 
the process of liberalisation and globalisation in South Korea has 
been the expansion of its welfare state’ (2003: 337). The Korean 
government recognised at this time that they had previously 
given a very low priority to social policy and with a steep rise in 
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poverty arising from the economic crisis, basic welfare needs 
were stark (You & Lee, 2000, pp 20–21). Lee also observed that 
despite following the IMF’s neo-liberal agenda that was tied to its 
significant funding throughout the crisis, Korea ‘pursued an 
expansion and consolidation of social welfare programs’  
(2004: 29).  
What is important in Kwon’s (2002) observations of Korea’s 
response to the economic crisis is that although it returned to 
economic stability far more quickly and completely than did its 
neighbours it continued with a strong social policy agenda. 
Kwon also observes that, like the Japanese and Taiwanese 
governments, the Korean government maintains a welfare 
system that is prepared to regulate but not finance welfare 
through the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor as 
it could with a strong progressive income tax system (2002: 6). 
Although expenditure in the area of social assistance under the 
National Basic Livelihood Security system increased dramatically 
after the post-crisis reforms of the Kim Dae Jung (KMD) 
government, by nearly three billion won between 1998 and 2000, 
reflecting greater access to assistance, as well increased need in 
that period (Lee, 2004, pp 293–294), welfare spending still did 
not reach a strongly redistributive level.  
According to Kwon (2002) it is most appropriate to view the 
Korean welfare state in the North East Asian context, as distinct 
from the South East Asian region.  The key similarity between 
the North East Asian states is their reliance on a social insurance 
system (mostly self-funded), with higher income earners gaining 
most benefit from redistribution (Kwon 2002: 5). Between all 
East Asian states Kwon notes an important political similarity 
where authoritarian governments dominate social policy-making 
‘using it an instrument for legitimation’ and as an instrument 
for economic policy rather than treating it as a competing 
demand of governance (2002: 6). This view is also supported by 
Joo’s analysis of the political purposes of governing elites in their 
development of key social policies such as medical insurance law 
and minimum wage law (1999: 388). Kwon describes the two key 
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elements that paved the way for the growth of a social policy 
agenda at the time of the economic crisis as being the failure of 
the bureaucracy to manage the economic crisis, and the change 
of government (2002: 9). 
East Asian states’ success in their pre-economic–crisis 
development had been at the cost of developing and funding a 
welfare state. It is from these characteristics that the idea of a 
‘developmental welfare state’ emerged  (Kwon 2002: 6). Prior to 
the 1980s Korea fitted this profile, with social policy being 
determined from above rather than from grass roots or 
community advocacy organisations. However, as Korea moved 
towards democracy, through the late 1980s and 1990s, critical 
voices about the welfare system were free to evolve but little 
happened to improve social protection for poor, disabled, 
unemployed and older people (Kwon 2002: 7). These issues 
were not addressed until the end of the decade, when Korea was 
seen to have achieved ‘true’ democracy. A shift away from the 
‘developmental welfare state’ to the ‘productive welfare state’ 
was introduced by the Kim Dae Jung government in 1999, 
reflecting the incorporation of social policy as an integral part of 
governance and as an ‘institutional means of keeping democracy 
and the market stable’ (Lee, 2004: 293). 
As with the pension and health insurance systems, it was in the 
early period of democratic government (1988–1992) that all 
social security payments (except family allowances) were 
introduced (Shin, 2000: 86). Social security was extremely 
constrained, however, and reflected “a Korean welfare model 
which stressed the role of the family, the partnership between 
public and private sectors, the development of human capital, 
and the avoidance of dependency on the state” (Ministry of 
Health and Social Affairs, 1994 as cited in Shin, 2000: 87). In 
1998 unemployment benefits coverage as an employment based 
contributory scheme (Shin, 2000: 94) were extended to cover 
workplaces with 10 or more employees, and later that year, to all 
workplaces. In 2000 the government introduced a modern social 
assistance program, the National Basic Livelihood Security 
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system (NBLS), and expanded the four social insurance schemes 
and new women’s policy initiatives (such as maternity benefits) 
and significantly increased overall welfare expenditure (Lee, 
2004: 293).  
Social policy for an ageing population was not developed in this 
period. There was no adequate response to the dramatically 
changing cultural, family, social and occupational arrangements 
that had occurred in the previous 20 years or so. In that time 
Korea had seen the doubling of its aged population from  
1.45 million in 1980 to 3 million in 2000 (Mi Oh & Warnes, 
2001: 703). This is an astounding statistic when compared with 
other countries: for example it took 115 years for France’s aged 
population to double, the UK 70 years and Japan more than 30 
years (Mi Oh & Warnes, 2001: 703). By 1998 there was a pressing 
need for ageing policy in Korea. Cultural and personal views of 
filial piety (the expectation that elderly parents would be cared 
for by the oldest son and his wife) were held by only 19.6 per 
cent of the population by 1996, due to the spread of education, 
changed material and occupational aspirations, increased 
workforce participation by women, and outside-of-family leisure 
(Mi Oh & Warnes, 2001: 706). Also, the new generation of older 
women did not want to repeat their experience of looking after 
their mothers-in-law, and along with older men, wanted 
independent lives (Jang, 2005).  
The previously discussed economic crisis of the late 1990s 
resulted in a dramatic drop in private income transfers to 
parents, reflecting, in part, the shift to highly urbanised, less 
stable employment (Mi Oh & Warnes, 2001: 706).  The need for 
mobility and rapid urbanisation was a further result of 
increasing ‘commodification’ of labour, resulting in a type of 
housing, either shanty towns or high rise apartment living, that 
was not conducive to extended family living (Mi Oh & Warnes, 
2001: 706). The proportion of people over 65 who lived with 
their families dropped from 77 per cent in 1984 to 50 per cent 
in 1994, with an equally dramatic increase in the number of 
older people living alone (Mi Oh & Warnes, 2001: 707). Media 
21 
reports in 1997 showed an alarming level of abuse of the frail 
aged by their children resulting in death or suicide, reflecting 
the overall incapacity of the new Korean society to care for its 
oldest and most frail members (Mi Oh & Warnes, 2001: 709). 
Although there was a dramatic increase in state spending on the 
aged between 1983 and 1996, in health, mental health,  
home care and residential care, this expenditure tended to 
benefit only the very poor and the very rich (Mi Oh & Warnes, 
2001, pp 710–718).  
It was also at this time that the issue of child abuse was finally 
addressed in legislation; with the introduction of the Child 
Abuse and Neglect Prevention Act. As indicated by Doe (2000), 
social policy on child abuse is a recent development. Although 
the rights of children were recognised in 1988, when the 
Declaration of Children’s Rights was introduced, the incidence 
and acceptance of physical abuse against children remained very 
high. Prior to the 1998, legislation to ‘protect’ children did not 
provide any definition or criteria by which to identify child 
abuse, nor any specific reference to physical abuse as 
maltreatment (Hahn and Guterman, 2001: 176). As reported in 
Hahm and Guterman’s (2001) survey of epidemiological studies 
and policy responses to child abuse in Korea, physical 
punishment of children was widely accepted amongst parents 
and professional groups such as teachers. Although the issue of 
child abuse was forced onto the government agenda by the 
South Korean Women’s Movement (as was the case in Australia 
in the 1970s, particularly in relation to sexual abuse), as well as 
by scholars and medical and social work practitioners, actual 
responses to child abuse in the public domain remained largely 
unchanged. Prior to the 1998 legislation, a number of non-
governmental organisations had established services for 
reporting abuse and endeavoured to conduct public education 
about child abuse in order to counter strong Confucian 
traditions of child ownership and discipline that dominated 
thinking in families (Hahm & Guterman, 2001, pp 169–170). 
Although research across the wider population showed a high 
22 
prevalence of physical abuse, reporting was extremely low. Up 
until the late 1990s, it would seem, child protection was virtually 
non-existent.  
In summary, the Korean welfare state emerged in the period of 
authoritarian governments, between 1961 and 1978 and growing 
incrementally in response to increased democratisation in the 
decade between 1987 and 1997, and expanding dramatically in 
response to the economic crisis of 1997, particularly under the 
influence of the Kim Dae Jung government from 1997–2003. 
There has been a growth in overall social welfare expenditure 
from 5.29 per cent of GDP in 1996 to 9.18 per cent in 2001. It is 
predicted that in around 30 years time, Korea’s social welfare 
expenditure will reach the average level of other OECD 
countries, around 20 per cent of GDP, mainly due to new 
welfare programs growing in response to changing demographic 
needs (Moon, 2000 as cited in Lee, 2004: 298).  
You and Lee (2000) see globalisation as having forced the 
Korean government to increase its social expenditure but 
suggest that the existing social policy framework in Korea 
requires a significant overhaul if it hopes to deal with key social 
problems. They point out that despite increased spending, the 
costs of education and health care have increased even faster, 
and they cast doubt on the government’s capacity to cope with 
growing unemployment (You & Lee, 2000: 26). In their view the 
most important issue for reform rests with taxation, and they call 
for a distributive, progressive system and propose that its role in 
social policies requires redefinition (You & Lee, 2000: 26). They 
also call for less intervention in the quasi-private education 
system, which they see as draining poorer peoples’ resources and 
excluding parents and teachers from educational policy 
decisions (You & Lee, 2000: 26). In a recent study of social 
security payments in Korea, Choi and Choe (2007) found that 
poverty reduction strategies since the 1997 East Asian crisis had 
not resulted in significant reductions in poverty. They found that 
31.8 per cent of people who received payments and who were 
living below the poverty line, remained below the poverty line 
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after the payments (Choi & Choe, 2007: 187). They also found 
that even though there was improved efficiency in the 
distribution of social security transfers there was little 
improvement in the effectiveness of such small transfers. 
Korean’s poverty support payments are one-seventh to one-tenth 
of Western welfare states (Choi & Choe, 2007: 189). Choi and 
Choe conclude that Korea needs both to redesign its income 
transfer system and develop diverse social assistance programs 
aimed at preventing future increases in the number of people 
living in poverty (2007: 189). 
Policy comparisons 
The following tables show comparative timelines for the 
introduction of some key social policies or welfare state 
instruments in Australia and Korea. Although not 
comprehensive, these tables reflect the very different social, 
economic and political histories of the two countries. Of obvious 
benefit to Australia was its early democratic base starting in the 
colony of New South Wales in 1843 (and other colonies soon to 
follow) and nationally in 1901. Korea’s late democratisation 
(widely acknowledged as 1992 with the first popularly elected 
civilian president) has meant that many social movements, such 
as the women’s movement in the 1970s and 1980s, have had no 
access to or influence on policy development until recently 
(Phillips & Jang, 2005).  
More detailed examination of specific policy areas reveals 
further complexity and difference between the two countries’ 
social and cultural contexts. For example, this chapter has barely 
mentioned Australia’s Indigenous population, which is highly 
overrepresented in all welfare needs groups. Korea does not 
have this specific configuration as part of its demography nor in 
its demands for social protection.  
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Table 1.1.   
Comparative table of key social policies Australia & South Korea 
Social 
Policy  
Australia Date 
Intro 
Govt 
Level 
South Korea Date 
Intro 
Govt  
Level 
Old age 
pension 
 
1st means-tested 
old age pension 
 
Universal old-age 
pension 
 
Means tested  
 
74% of >65yr 
olds rely on govt 
pension for main 
income source 
 
1908 
 
 
1973-
75 
 
1976 
 
2005 
 
National 
 
1st pensions for 
civil servants 
 
National Welfare 
Pensions Act 
 
National Basic 
Livelihood & 
Social Insurance  
 
1960 
 
 
1994 
 
 
2000 
 
 
National  
 
 
National  
 
 
National 
 
Unemplo-
yment 
Benefit 
Intro of 
Commonwealth 
unemployment 
and sickness 
benefits - flat-rate 
payments from 
general revenue 
- means tested 
‘Mutual 
Obligation’ 
Reforms 
1945  
 
 
 
 
1999-
2005 
National 
 
 
 
 
National 
Expansion of 
unemployment 
insurance to 
include 
workplaces of 10 
or more & later al 
workplaces – 
employment 
contributory 
scheme of limited 
time 
1998 National 
Health 
Insurance 
Medibank free 
universal state 
funded health & 
medical  
Medicare, small 
tax contribution 
from all income-
earners 
Free for low 
income & 
children  
Intro of private 
insurance tax 
incentives & 
minimisation of 
bulk-billing 
Reintroduction of 
bulk-billing for 
children & poor 
1972 
 
 
1983 
 
 
1997 
 
 
 
 
2004 
National 
 
 
National 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National 
Medical 
Insurance     
Initially only 
covered large 
workplace w/ 500 
employees & a 
system for low 
income & poor 
people - Public 
Assistance 
scheme, called 
Medicaid     
Whole population 
compulsorily 
covered  
1977 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1989 
National 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National 
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Table 1.2.   
Comparative table of key social policies Australia & South Korea 
 
Social 
Policy  
Australia Date 
Intro 
Govt 
Level 
South Korea Date 
Intro 
Govt 
Level 
Gender 
equity 
Women’s vote 
Women’s policy 
Instruments & 
gender equity – & 
intro of Equal 
Opportunity 
legislation 
Dismantling of 
women’s govt 
department  
De-funding of  large 
# of women’s orgs.  
 
Change of portfolio 
from Status of 
Women to Women’s 
Issues 
1902 
1973–75 
& 83–96 
1996 – 
2005 
 
1996 
 
2005 
National 
National 
& states 
National 
& states 
 
National 
& some 
states 
National 
 
National 
Women’s vote 
Introduction of 
Women’s Policy 
Master plan on 
Women’s Policy 
 
Introduction of Equal 
Opportunity Legislation
 
Ministry of Gender 
Equality established 
Women's Policy 
Coordination 
Committee  
1948 
1983
-97 
1995 
 
1997 
 
2001 
 
2002 
National 
National 
 
National 
 
 
National 
 
National 
 
National 
Child 
protect-
ion 
Early legislation 
covering institutions 
& child welfare 
Beginning of 
deinstitutionalisation 
of children in state 
care 
Legislation included 
provisions for all 
forms of abuse 
1920s–
1960s 
 
1970s  
 
 
Early 
1980s 
States 
 
States 
 
 
States 
Declaration of 
Children’s rights 
 
1st Child Abuse and 
Neglect Prevention Act 
1988 
 
1998 
National 
 
National 
Domestic 
violence 
& sexual 
assault 
Refuges, sexual 
assault referral 
centres 
Criminal legislation 
(AVOs etc) 
Family Law changes 
1974 & 
early 
1980s 
Early 
1980s 
1975 & 
1995 
National 
& states 
 
States 
National 
Prevention of Sexual 
Violence Act  
 
Prevention of Domestic 
Violence and 
Protection of Victims 
Act 
1994 
 
1997 
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Conclusion 
This overview of the nature and histories of key social policies in 
Korea and Australia demonstrates that there are many 
differences between the two countries, but it also shows that 
there are shared concerns about key social issues, as well as 
similar government responses to some of these concerns. In 
exploring the social and political nature of social policy 
development this chapter aimed to add to an understanding of 
the range of responses to challenges brought about by important 
demographic changes in Australia and Korea that are addressed 
in the following chapters. 
This chapter has also presented some theoretical ideas about 
how to view the Australian and Korea welfare states, noting the 
rise of Asian welfare states as a key interest and challenge to a 
previously Eurocentric scholarship in the field. Drawing on the 
work of welfare state scholars in Australia and Korea, the above 
discussion also demonstrates the lively critical engagement of 
researchers of social policy in both countries. This chapter also 
highlights an interesting tension between the directions of the 
Korean and Australian welfare states: as Korea moves rapidly 
forward, embracing stronger equity and stronger participation 
by the state in social policy, Australia pulls away from culturally 
entrenched egalitarian approaches to welfare toward an 
‘enablement’ model or more strongly emphasised market 
model. Some of the broader critical analyses reflected in the 
literature reviewed in this chapter are also articulated by the 
researchers in the proceeding chapters, providing some in-depth 
explorations of social problems arising for generational change 
in Australia and Korea. It is hoped that the forward-looking 
nature of much of the research reported in this book will 
contribute to governmental and societal responses required to 
address the specific needs of the rapidly transforming 
populations of the two countries.  
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